This paper introduces a new Kalman filter-based method for detecting sensor faults in linear dynamic systems. In contrast with existing sequential fault-detection algorithms, the proposed method enables direct evaluation of the integrity risk, which is the probability that an undetected fault causes state estimate errors to exceed predefined bounds of acceptability. 
I. Introduction
YNAMIC estimators designed to operate under nominal conditions are vulnerable to rarely-occurring faults such as sensor failures. Detection algorithms can be implemented to mitigate the impact of sensor faults on estimator performance [1, 2] , which is essential in safety-critical applications such as vehicle automation for ground and air transportation [3, 4] . Of primary concern in these types of applications is the system's ability to evaluate the integrity risk, which is the probability of undetected faults causing the estimate error to exceed predefined limits of acceptability (also called alert limits [3, 4] ). Most approaches currently implemented in real-time systems use simple measurement processing schemes, which facilitate integrity risk monitoring at the cost of decreased estimation performance. For example, existing satellite-based navigation systems designed for aviation applications are based on snapshot position estimation [4] [5] [6] , which can limit the accuracy and fault-free integrity performance. In this paper, a new sequential fault-detection algorithm is derived, analyzed, and evaluated. This algorithm opens the possibility of optimal estimation using a Kalman filter under nominal conditions, while enabling accurate and efficient integrity risk evaluation in the presence of measurement faults.
Despite multiple prior approaches (reviewed below), there is currently no widely used sequential fault-detection algorithm in safety-critical applications. One major shortcoming of published methods is their limited ability to accurately quantify integrity risk. In practice, integrity risk evaluation is needed when designing dynamic systems to achieve required levels of integrity, and it is needed operationally to predict if a mission can be safely initiated.
Evaluating integrity risk includes both assessing the fault detection capability and quantifying the impact of undetected faults on state estimate errors.
Model-based fault detection methods include integrity monitoring (IM) algorithms, which provide the means for rigorous integrity risk computation. Most existing implementations of IM are 'snapshot' detection schemes [4] [5] [6] .
For instance, the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) method used in Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) exploits redundant observations at one time of interest [7] [8] [9] . Snapshot IM is a natural choice for punctual state estimation, but it is insufficient for sequential implementations that involve measurement filtering, for example using a Kalman filter.
The Kalman filter (KF) is a recursive estimator that exploits information from both the measurements and the system's dynamic model. The KF is widely implemented because it recursively generates optimal current-time state estimates, which maximizes current-time accuracy and fault-free integrity performance.
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In safety-critical applications, the sequence of measurements used for estimation must be monitored against rare event faults. In contrast with nominal measurement errors, whose distributions can be reliably modeled using large amounts of experimental data, sensor faults are difficult to observe because of their low probability of occurrence. In order to avoid making assumptions on unknown fault distributions, a bound on the integrity risk corresponding the worst case fault can be evaluated. This bound is then compared to a specified integrity risk requirement to assess 'availability,' which is defined as the fraction of time where outputs of the estimation system can safely be used [4, 5] . It is therefore of primary importance for system availability to derive a tight bound on the integrity risk.
Sequential detection approaches have been investigated over the past 60 years [1, 10, 11, 12] . The large majority of published algorithms have aimed at detecting abrupt changes in a random variable distribution [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . The algorithms include multiple-hypotheses [18] [19] [20] [21] and innovation-based methods [22] [23] [24] [25] , and have been employed in a variety of applications including financial and medical surveillance applications [26] , industrial quality-control [1, 27] , sonar noise cancellation [28] , and target tracking [29] . However, most of these procedures quantify the faultdetection capability in terms of time-to-detect, without regard to the fault's impact on state estimates, hence leaving integrity risk evaluation unaddressed.
Additional references are cited in [29] : the extensive literature review of research efforts carried out over the past two decades demonstrates the lively and sustained interest for real-time sequential fault detection methods, especially in the context of tightly-coupled integration of the Global Positioning System (GPS) with Inertial Navigation Systems (INS). The most elaborate sequential fault-detection algorithms provide protection level equations, which are measures of the integrity risk in terms of position state-domain bounds. But these bounds are loose [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] and they require computationally expensive processes. For example, the solution-separation approach to sequential implementations uses banks of KF [35] , whose number increases as the number of samples in the timesequence increases.
In response, in this work, a new, computation and memory-efficient KF-based IM method is derived, which can be implemented in real-time while providing a tight bound on the integrity risk under the worst-case fault assumption.
In Section II of this paper, a batch least-squares residual-based IM algorithm is described, which was introduced in [36] for a specific navigation application, and is generalized here to linear dynamic systems. The batch IM approach is similar to the well-established snapshot RAIM used in GPS applications [7] [8] [9] , but it is applied to a sequence of measurements and of system dynamics over a finite window in time. Least-squares batch implementations can be implemented sequentially using a sliding-window mechanism. But they also require considerable computation and memory resources for the storage and processing of past-time measurements and state coefficients -which is why a KF-based IM approach is ultimately pursued.
Still, in this work, the batch IM approach is used to derive results that will be extended to KF-IM. For instance, given a time sequence of measurements and state dynamics, the fact that the current-time state estimates are identical for a KF and for a batch estimator is exploited. Also, measurements stacked in a batch can be expressed in a single equation, which is much easier to analyze than a KF (which iteratively processes multiple equations).
Finally and most importantly, batch-IM highlights two conditions that facilitate the evaluation of a tight bound on the integrity risk: first, the state estimate and detection test statistic are statistically independent, and second, their probability distributions are known. The KF-IM test statistic is specifically designed to satisfy these two keyconditions. Section III describes the KF-IM. In the first part of Section III, the weighted norm of the current-time KF residual is shown to be independent from the estimate error, and it is proved to follow a generalized non-central chisquare distribution, whose parameters are fully identified. Thus, the current-time KF test statistic fulfills the two key-conditions that enable the determination of a tight bound on the integrity risk. But the KF also generates pasttime residuals, which could be exploited to improve detection of faults that persist in time, and could provide early indicators of threats affecting current-time and future-time state estimates. Therefore, in the second part of Section III, a cumulative KF-IM test statistic is established using both current and past-time residuals. First, the probability distributions of past-time residuals are defined. Second, it is proven that current-time state estimates and past-time residuals are statistically independent. Third, the random parts of current-time and past-time residuals are shown to be mutually independent. As a result, KF-IM achieves rigorous integrity risk bound evaluation using a test-statistic that can be recursively updated, by simply adding a current-time component to an accumulated past-time residual-based test statistic.
In addition, in Section IV, a method is developed to derive the worst-case fault affecting a measurement sequence. Measurements collected during the filtering period are all vulnerable to rare-event integrity threats. In order to capture the impact of such failures over time, a set of realistic fault modes can be considered including impulses, steps, and ramps of all magnitudes and start times. But this set of canonical faults does not constitute a comprehensive description of all integrity threats. To circumvent this problem, a new concept is introduced for the batch-IM implementation with the derivation of theoretical worst-case faults, which maximize the integrity risk.
Worst-case fault profiles are instrumental in evaluating bounds on the integrity risk.
Finally, in Section V, the integrity monitoring performance of both batch-IM and KF-IM is illustrated with an application to aircraft precision approach navigation. Sequences of code and carrier phase GNSS measurements are used for positioning and real-valued (floating) cycle ambiguity estimation. Batch-IM and KF-IM are evaluated against single-satellite fault profiles for different satellite geometries. System availability is quantified assuming a near-future GPS/Galileo carrier-phase based navigation system, at multiple locations over the Contiguous United States (CONUS).
II. Batch Residual-Based Integrity Monitoring
The batch least squares residual-based fault-detection algorithm (or batch-IM) was previously implemented in a satellite-based navigation system [36] as a direct extension of the well-established snapshot RAIM method. Batch-IM is described below for linear dynamic systems in general and will be used in Section III to derive results relevant to the KF-IM approach.
A linear dynamic system is described at any discrete time k of a time-sequence (spanning from time 1 to the current time noted q ), by a measurement equation and a process equation:
The worst case fault vector Q f derived in Section IV will be used in place of the unknown vector Q f to evaluate an upper bound on the integrity risk.
C. Batch Residual-Based Fault Detection
Similar to the snapshot residual-based IM approach [38] , a batch residual vector | Q Q r is defined as:
The norm of | Q Q r weighted by 1 Q  V is the batch detection test statistic:
From snapshot fault detection analysis [38] , the test statistic 
where I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimensions. A worst-case value for 2 | Q Q  will be established using the fault vector Q f derived in Section IV.
D. Integrity Risk Evaluation for Batch-IM
Integrity risk requirements are specified in terms of an alert limit  , a continuity risk requirement R C P , , and an integrity risk requirement R I P , [5] . The following events are considered.
 The risk of hazardous information is defined as the probability of the estimate error T is set in compliance with R C P , to limit the probability of false alarms under fault-free (FF) conditions [38] . | Q Q T is derived from the following equation:
where the probability of FF conditions FF P is typically approximated to 1.
In the presence of a fault (conditional event 'F'), the integrity risk I P is defined as a joint probability:
where the prior probability of fault occurrence is typically determined using a history of experimental data (e.g., as in [39] ). An upper bound I P on the integrity risk I P is established by substituting the worst case fault vector Q f (derived in Section IV) for Q f in Eq. (9) and (13) . I P is then used to assess whether the integrity performance criterion is fulfilled, i.e., if the following availability criterion is satisfied:
From snapshot residual-based fault detection analysis, the random parts of to be statistically independent [38, 40] . It follows from Eq. (15) that the integrity risk and its bound can be expressed as products of probabilities:
x and the sparse batch observation matrix Q H in Eq. (3) into the residual definition of Eq. (10): In addition, the batch measurement noise covariance matrix Q V is block-diagonal. It follows that the weighted norm squared of the batch residual in Eq. (11) can be expressed as:
Each term of the sum corresponds to an individual residual component expressed in Eq. (18), and it is weighted by it corresponding block matrix in
Particularly relevant in this work is the fact that the current-time batch residual component | q Q r and its weighted norm can be computed using a KF. This observation is the starting point for the derivation of the KF-IM method.
III. Kalman Filter-Based Integrity Monitoring
This section presents the mathematical development, theorems and proofs for the cumulative KF IM method. A step-by-step summary of the algorithm's implementation is provided at the end of the section.
A. Current-Time KF Test Statistic
The current-time state estimate vector | r is first considered as a potential detection test statistic:
The following paragraphs address the two key-conditions that given in the third paragraph of Appendix C). It follows that the integrity risk bound can be expressed as a product of probabilities:
It can be noted that KF innovation-based test statistics are not pursued in this work because, unlike the residual | q Q r in Eq. (18), the KF innovation (
Second, the probability distribution of
is given in Eq. (8), so that the probability of hazardous information, (22), can be evaluated for the worst-case fault Q f . However, the probability distribution of
is as yet unknown. It is important to note that while the distribution of the total sum of partial test statistics in Eq. (19) is fully defined (by Eq. (12)), the distribution of individual terms of the sum is nevertheless undetermined.
Theorem I: Probability Distribution of the Current-Time Test Statistic
The current-time test statistic 
The index i in Eq. (23) 
The coefficient
 is the i th non-zero element of the diagonal matrix A Λ and
where the matrix
Equation (23) defines a generalized non-central chi-square distribution. It cannot be expressed analytically without an integral form or an infinite sum [43] , but its cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be computed numerically to any desired level of accuracy using published algorithms (reference [44] is used in this work).
However, Theorem I expresses the probability distribution of a partial test-statistic in terms of batch matrices (subscripts Q in Eq. (24)). In practice, processing batch matrices is computationally and memory expensive, so a recursive version is defined below.
Consider the current-time KF measurement update equation:
where q K is the current-time KF gain. The right-hand-side terms in Eq. (25) were arranged to isolate two statistically independent random vectors q z and
. Also, Eq. (18) established that:
Substituting Eq. (25) into (26) results in:
This current-time residual component is normally distributed with covariance matrix
is the state prediction covariance matrix of
. Equations (27) and (28) set the basis for the proof of the Corollary to Theorem I.
Corollary to Theorem I: Distribution of the Current-Time Test Statistic for Recursive Implementation
The current-time test statistic can be expressed as:
where q i,  are the q p non-zero singular values of the 
R
is not full-rank).
In practice, to evaluate the bound on the integrity risk, the mean of q i y , in (31) is computed for the worst-case fault vector q f (derived in Section IV) and for the worst-case mean of Q q| δx . The latter is obtained by running a KF in parallel to the actual state estimator, with deterministic observation
. The entire integrity risk bound evaluation process is summarized at the end of Section III.
At this point, it was shown that the weighted norm of the current-time KF residual in Eq. (20) enables direct integrity risk bound evaluation because it is independent of the current-time state estimate error, and because its probability distribution is fully defined. The next paragraphs will show that past-time KF residuals can also be exploited. Past-time residuals can improve the detection of faults that persist in time, and provide early indicators of faults affecting current-time state estimates.
B. Cumulative KF Test Statistic
The method described in this section shows how past-time KF residuals | 
The weighted norm of the residual in Eq. (32) is written as:
which can easily be computed at epoch k using a KF.
One can briefly note that the full batch residual vector in Eq. (18) 
This means that the KF-IM residual is ineffective in detecting plant and actuator faults. In systems that are vulnerable to these types of threats, batch-IM (or forward-backward smoother IM) can be implemented instead.
The next paragraphs will show that
satisfies the two key-conditions required for accurate integrity risk evaluation.
Fig. 1 Full Batch and Subset Batch Realizations
First, the probability distribution of the partial residual's weighted norm 
Its probability distribution is determined using Theorem III.
Theorem III: Mutual Independence between Current-Time and Past-Time Residuals
The random parts of current and past-time KF residual components K k| r at all epochs k are mutually independent. The proof of Theorem III is presented in Section D of the Appendix. It is established using Theorem II and using an expression of the partial residual K k| r akin to Eq. (27) .
According to Theorem III, the KF residual components K k| r whose norms squared are summed in Eq. (34) are all mutually independent. Equation (34) can be rewritten using the Corollary to Theorem I as:
Theorem I and III prove that the variables k i y , are all mutually independent, normally distributed random variables.
It follows that r , . The integrity risk bound using KF-IM for the worst-case fault vector Q f can ultimately be evaluated as:
Summary of the Cumulative KF-IM Method
In practical operations, the cumulative KF-IM method can be used both for fault detection and for integrity risk bound evaluation.
The fault-detection process is straightforward. At any discrete time q, the following steps are performed. can be evaluated.
 The integrity risk bound I P is obtained by multiplying the product of these two probabilities with the prior probability of fault occurrence F P as expressed in Eq. (37).
The integrity risk bound provided by the cumulative KF IM method assumes a worst case fault vector q f , which is derived in Section IV.
IV. Worst Case Fault Derivation
In order to protect the dynamic system against all potential sensor faults, the integrity risk must be conservatively evaluated. An upper bound on the integrity risk can be determined for the worst-case fault magnitude (i.e., for the norm of the fault vector that maximizes the integrity risk), and for the worst-case fault mode. The fault mode designates the subset of measurements affected by the fault, i.e., the non-zero elements of the fault vector. In sequential fault detection, which is carried out over multiple time-epochs, IM analysis not only considers the fault mode and magnitude, but also the fault profile over time.
Application-specific solutions have been implemented in the literature (e.g., [18, 26] ). For instance, step and ramp-type fault models of all magnitudes and start times are assumed in [45] . Such basic fault profiles may account for some realistic integrity threats affecting some sensors, but they do not provide a comprehensive description of all potential faults. A more direct approach is investigated here by deriving theoretical faults specifically designed to maximize the integrity risk I P . In this paper, the worst-case fault profile for the batch IM process is established. For comparison purposes, the same fault profiles are used for batch-IM and KF-IM in performance evaluations of Section V. Worst-case fault profiles for KF-based method will be analyzed in future work.
The worst-case fault maximizes the batch position estimate error (most hazardous) while minimizing the residual (most misleading). Fault vectors that belong to the range space of Q H (e.g.,
are strictly undetectable using the residual ( This observation illustrates a fundamental limitation of the residual-based fault detection method, which cannot ensure detection against faults affecting more than measurements [38] . Fortunately, if measurement sources are independent, the probability of occurrence of multiple simultaneous sensor failures is often extremely low. In this work, multiple simultaneous sensor failures are assumed not to cause the number of faulted measurements to exceed . This ensures that none of the fault vectors under consideration belongs entirely to the range space of Q H . A method to account for the integrity risk caused by the unlikely event of a number of failed measurements higher than Q Q m n  is provided in [45] .
A fault on a subset of sensors causes a subset of elements of the fault vector Q f to be non-zero. Let NZ n be the number of non-zero elements in Q f (i.e., the number of faulty samples). As discussed in the previous paragraph, NZ n shall not exceed Q Q m n  . The vector Q f may be expressed as: Equations (9) and (13) 
The sensitivity of the integrity risk to FM g is represented in Fig. 2 , where 
The following definition is used in the next steps of the derivation:
The matrix ) (
n × NZ n and is full rank for any T Z corresponding to a single-sensor fault (or to a fault affecting a small subset of sensors). In this case, NZ f is given by:
and the failure mode slope can be rewritten as:
. A similar derivation can be found in [46] in the context of snapshot RAIM, for single-epoch faults simultaneously affecting multiple measurements. Finally, the worst-case fault that maximizes the probability of hazardous misleading information is:
.
V. Performance Analysis
Performance comparisons for an illustrative example of a near-future multi-constellation navigation system are carried out to quantify availability using batch-IM versus KF-IM, as well as using existing snapshot IM methods.
A. Availability Analysis for Aircraft Precision Approach
The performance analysis is structured around an example application of precision navigation for aircraft approach and landing. During precision approach under limited visibility, the pilot makes the decision of whether to initiate or to abort the mission based on the computed integrity risk bound. Therefore, in this application, timely and accurate integrity risk evaluation is critical. In addition, aircraft approach navigation requirements are extremely stringent [5] . They are challenging to satisfy using 'snapshot' positioning, but might be fulfilled using measurement filtering over time. The batch-IM method could be implemented, but airplanes have limited computation and memory resources. Instead, the KF-IM algorithm can enable real-time evaluation of tight bounds on the integrity risk.
In this example application, aircraft navigation is based on near-term future GNSS ranging signals from GPS and Galileo satellites. GNSS carrier phase ranging measurements are biased by cycle ambiguities, which remain constant for as long as the signal is continuously tracked. In this case, the dynamic model accounts for the constant cycle ambiguity biases. Measurement models also account for sources of time-correlated errors. These simple yet realistic measurement and process models are used to illustrate the batch-IM and KF-IM performance.
The measurement model used in this work is similar to the one described in [36] . Differential GNSS measurements used for aircraft positioning include code phase (pseudorange) k ρ and carrier phase k φ signals [47] .
At each measurement time k , these observations are stacked together for all satellites in a measurement vector: 
Equation (48) The satellite ranging error models (captured in ERR H , ERR Φ , ERR s , and ERR w ) are described in detail in [36] .
They are not essential for the performance analysis, but they were included to demonstrate that KF-IM can be efficiently implemented in a realistic dynamic system. Thus, nominal satellite orbit ephemeris errors are modeled as ramps over time with constant gradients. Vertical tropospheric decorrelation is modeled as an exponential function of the change in aircraft altitude multiplied by a constant tropospheric refractivity index [48] . The unknown but constant gradients and tropospheric parameter are included as states in ERR s and assumed constant over time (corresponding elements in ERR w are zero-valued). Ionospheric delay is eliminated using dual-frequency code and carrier measurements [49] . Time-correlated noise due to multipath signal reflections is modeled as a first order Gauss Markov Process (GMP) with a 1 min time-constant, and is also incorporated by state augmentation in ERR s (the corresponding elements in ERR w are the zero-mean normally-distributed driving noise vector of the multipath error's GMP).
The fault vector k f in this performance analysis assumes single-satellite faults. Satellite faults are described in [39] . Fault sources include, for example, satellite out-gassing, thruster firing, satellite clock instability, and erroneous orbit ephemeris broadcast. Their impact on ranging measurements can cause steps, ramps, sinusoids, and even more complicated fault profiles are mentioned in [39] . Based on the information provided in [39] , the prior probability of fault F P is conservatively assumed to be 4 10  (the same number is used in [5] ).
The fault-free measurement equation (46) and process equation (48) are expressed in the form of Eqs (1) and (2).
The worst-case fault k f given in Eq. (45) is considered. Equations (46), (48), and (45) are used to evaluate bounds on the integrity risk using batch-IM and KF-IM as described in Eq. (17) and (37) of Sections II and III, respectively.
In this analysis, the airplane is assumed to follow a straight-in trajectory toward the runway, at a constant 70 m/s velocity, along a constant 3 deg glideslope angle. Hazardous information is determined based on the vertical position coordinate. Navigation requirements in Eq. (14), (17) and (37) white to 100%. Availability drops below 50% at a few locations, versus 96% for the lowest availability obtained using cumulative KF-IM. Figure 5 emphasizes the benefit of using both current and past-time KF residuals.
C. Improvement Brought by KF-IM over Existing Snapshot IM Methods
Snapshot IM algorithms such as RAIM [7] [8] [9] 38] can provide bounds on the integrity risk corresponding to the worst case fault. Snapshot IM performance is first evaluated using current-time measurements only. In this case, availability of integrity in the presence of faults drops as low as 40%, as shown in Fig. 6 , which uses the same color code as in Fig. 5 . But even more significant is the result in terms of availability of fault-free (FF) integrity. The integrity risk under FF conditions is defined as:
where FF P was defined in Eq. (14) . The FF availability criterion specifies that FF I P , should be below a required value [5] of 7 
10
 in this example. This criterion did not need to be mentioned earlier because it did not impact the overall navigation performance (FF availability was 100% at all locations in Fig. 3-5 ). But FF availability is the driving performance limitation for snapshot IM. This result emphasizes the fact that many applications, including GNSS-based aircraft precision approach navigation, require measurement filtering over time. 
Measurements
Therefore, instead of using raw measurements, snapshot IM is evaluated again, but using pre-processed data. The impact of receiver noise on GNSS ranging signals can be reduced at the measurement level (by smoothing code measurements using time-differenced carrier signals as described in [4] ). The filtered measurements are then utilized for snapshot weighted least-squares position estimation. Even though this approach is GNSS-specific, it is worth considering because it is representative of existing implementations [4] [5] [6] . The snapshot approach is also computationally efficient, but it does not exploit the system's dynamics. For instance, in this example application, the motion of the satellites over the filtering period was shown to improve cycle ambiguity estimation in [50] . This leverage is exploited in batch-IM and KF-IM, but it is not in snapshot-IM. Figure 7 is the availability map obtained for snapshot-IM using pre-processed data (assuming the same sequence of measurements as in Fig. 3 to 6 ). The color code is the same as in Fig. 3 and 4 . FF availability is 100% at all locations. The map shows a substantial drop in availability (in the presence of faults) as compared to KF-IM in Fig.   4 . The lowest availability value for snapshot-IM is 86% versus 96% for KF-IM. This analysis illustrates the potential of KF-IM to exploit the information provided by both the measurements and the system dynamics in order to establish tight bounds on the integrity risk. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper introduced a new Kalman filter-based sensor fault detection method for dynamic systems that require measurement filtering over time. A recursively-updated Kalman filter integrity monitoring (KF-IM) test statistic was designed to exploit both current-time and past-time residual contributions while satisfying two key-conditions. First, the test statistic was proved to be statistically independent from the current-time state estimate error. Second, it was shown to follow a generalized non-central chi-square distribution. As a result, this easy-to-implement KF-IM algorithm enables direct and rigorous integrity risk evaluation. Availability analyses were carried out for an example aircraft navigation application where differential Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) carrier phase signals were used for positioning. Results showed that the new recursive method could achieve a level of performance similar to that of a much more computationally and memory-expensive batch fault-detection process. KF-IM opens the possibility for efficient, real-time Kalman filter-based estimation with the assurance of a tight bound on the integrity risk. 
The vector * Q z of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables is substituted back into Eq. (49):
The This concludes the proof of Theorem I.
B. Proof Of Corollary to Theorem I: Distribution of Current-Time Test Statistic for Recursive Implementation
The corollary to Theorem I aims at expressing the probability distribution of Equations (27) and (28) 
R
is not invertible, which prevents direct derivation of the proof of the Corollary to Theorem I using a method akin to the proof of Theorem I.
Instead, the development starts by defining a matrix B :
The SVD of B is noted: 
Substituting Eq. (59) into the left hand side of (66) shows that this expression is true. Therefore it must be true that
